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JN THE SUPREME COURT JF THE STATE 
OF UTAH 
I. J. WAGNER and ILENE J. 
WAGNER, husband and wife, 
and WALLACE A. WRIGHT, JR., 
and JERALYN T. WRIGHT, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs - Appellants, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal 
corporation, 
Defendant - Respondent. 
CASE NJ. 12618 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action by the Plaintiffs and Appellants 
for a declaratory judgment that a State statute, the 
Utah Underground Conversion of Utilities Law, and an 
ordinance of Salt Lake City enacted pursuant to such 
statute, are each invalid and unconstitutional and for 
an injunction against the Defendant from undertaking 
any further proceedings in connection with Under-
ground Conversion of Utilities District Number8-F-1A. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Both parties filed motions for summary judgment 
based upon the pleadings on file and a stipulation of 
facts entered into between the parties. After argu-
2 
ment, the District Court determined that there w 
d
. as 
no isp~te as to any material facts, that the statute 
and ordinance were constitutional and that th · . . em 
1unct10n requested should be denied. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs-Appellants seek reversal of the District 
Court judgment and a holding that the statute and 
1 
e 
ordinance involved are unconstitutional and according i 
1 
ly that the injunction prayed for should be granted. I 
ST A TEMENT OF FACTS 
The 1969 regular session of the Utah Legislature 
enacted in Chapter 157, Laws of Utah, 1969, a com· 
prehensive statute entitled the "Utah Underground 
Conversion of Utilities Law". This has been compil· . 
ed in Utah Code Annotated 1953, as Sections 54-8·1 
through 54-8-30, both inclusive. (This statute is som~ 
times ref erred to in the pleadings and in this Brief 
as the "State Statute"). The Board of Commissioners~ 
of Salt Lake City, by ordinance passed 8ctober Zl, P 
1970 which became effective on its publication on;; 
November 18, 1970, adopted an ordinance whic~ ~u~ j 
stantially re-enacts for Salt Lake City the prov1s10m; 
of the State Statute. Such ordinance is found al I, 
· es oi ' 
Chapter 7 of Title 39 of the Revised Ordmanc : 
Salt Lake City, Utah 1953. (This ordinance is so~~ i 
times ref erred to in the pleadings and in this Bnef I 
as the "Ordinance"). f , I eries 0 av , 
Commencing in September of 1970, a s al 1 
tions were taken and procedures followed by 
5 11 
3 
Lake City, Utah Power and Light Company (the 
"Power Company") and Mountain Bell Telephone 
company (the "Telephone Company'') leading to the 
establishment on February 3, 1971, of Underground 
Conversion of Utilities District Number 8-F-lA (the 
"Utilities District") comprising all of Lots 14 to 19, 
inclusive, of Plat "C", North Hills Subdivision. In-
cluded in the Utilities District is the property owned 
by Plaintiffs l.J. Wagner and Ilene J. Wagner. Im-
mediately adjacent to the Utilities District but not 
included within its boundaries is the property owned 
by Plaintiffs Wallace A. Wright, Jr. and J eralyn T. 
Wright. Both sets of Plaintiffs are residents of Salt 
Lake City and property taxpayers. 
The Utilities District was established for the pur-
pose of removing overhead electric and telephone wires 
and other facilities from the property within the 
District and replacing the same with underground 
electric and telephone communication facilities to serve 
each of the six lots within the Utilities District. The 
Power Company and the Telephone Company provide 
electric and telephone service respectively, to all 
properties within the Utilities District. 
In accordance with the State Statute (54-8-6), the 
Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake City received 
a petition signed by twcrthirds of the owners of the 
real property and by the owners of not less than twcr 
thirds in value of the real property within the 
proposed District, and adopted a Resolution that the 
proposed District would promote the public conveni-
ence, necessity and welfare. A study was provided 
6 
the unpaid balance of the assessments (54-8-22) bui 
as yet no bonds have been issued. ! 
Within the period prescribed by 54-8-23 of the Statt 
Statute, Plaintiffs filed this action seeking in theu 
First Count on behalf of themselves and in theu 
Second Count on behalf of themselves and all other 
residents and taxpayers of Salt Lake City as a class. 
to obtain a declaratory judgment pursuant to the 
Declaratory Judgments Act of Utah, determining that 
the State Statute and the Ordinance and each of them 
1 
are invalid and unconstitutional and also seeking an; 
injunction against Salt Lake City from undertakini 
any further proceedings in connection with the Utili· 
ties District. 
From a summary judgment holding that the State 
Statute and Ordinance are constitutional, this apperu 
is prosecuted. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE STATE STATUTE AND ORDINANCE 
ARE UNCONSTITUTJ'.)NAL IN TIIAT THEY 
AUTH'.)RIZE PUBLIC ACTION F'.)R A PRI- 1 
V ATE PURP'.)SE, LEND THE CREDIT '.)f A 
MUNICIPALITY FJR A PRIVATE PURP'.)SE 
AND DELEGATE MUNICIPAL FUNCTIONS 
TO PRIVATE CORPORATIJNS. 
Preliminary to our discussion of this point, an un· 
s t Statute 
derstanding of the framework of the ta e 
and Ordinance is appropriate. 
. ty owners 
On the petition of two-thirds of the proper th 
·ty or town, e 
within a given area of a county, c1 
7 
governing body of such municipality may form a spe--
cial improvement district for the purpose of convert-
ing overhead electric and telephone communication 
facilities to underground facilities. While it is clear 
that the governing body can act on a petition of the 
property owners (State Statute, §54-8-6; Ordinance 
§39-7-6), it is possible to construe the act to permit 
the governing body to act on its own initiative (see 
State Statute, §54-8-4 and Ordinance, §39-7-4). At 
any rate, when the initial action is taken the next 
step is to refer the matter to the public utility cor-
porations involved for a study of the feasibility of 
the project and of the cost of the work to be done. 
Based upon this report and not on the report of any 
public official or employee, the city may then give 
notice of its intention to create the improvement 
district and hold a hearing at which real property 
owners within the district may attend. If the owners 
fail to attend and object, they waive any further ob-
jection to the creation of the district, the making of 
the improvements and the inclusion of their real 
property within the district (State Statute, §54-8-12; 
Ordinance, § 39-7-13). After the hearing, and making 
such adjustments to the size of the district as may 
be appropriate, the governing body may proceed with 
the creation of the district by adoption of a resolu-
tion. 
The next step is the preparation of an assessment 
list followed by the adoption of a resolution declaring 
the entire cost of the improvement "including the 
cost of construction as determined from the cost and 
8 
feasibility report [of the utilities] " The · · · · resolu. t~on also constitutes an approval of the assessment 
hst subject to adjustment by a board of equalizat· I 
!On . 
and review. Notice of the proposed assessments are I 
given to each of the real property owners within the 
district and a hearing is held where real propertr / 
owners are heard "on the question of whether hls r 
property will be benefited by the proposed improve-
ment to the amount of the proposed assessment 
against his property and whether the amount assessed 
against his property constitutes more than his proper 1 
proportional share of the total cost of the improve- ! 
ment." (State Statute, §54-8-16; Ordinance, ~39-7-171. I 
Assessments may be adjusted at the hearing and I 
after all adjustments are made, the governing body 
then levies an assessment against the property within 
I 
the district. The assessment is payable immediately 
or in installments over a period of time specified in' 
the assessment resolution not exceeding twentyyears. 
(State Statute, ~54-8-19; Ordinance, ~39-7-21). 
At this point the governing body may issue bonds 
of the county, city or town involved, secured by a 1 
'od I pledge of the assessments and payable over the peri I 
of time the assessments are payable (State Statute. : 
§54-8-22; Ordinance, §39-7-24). 
To this point with exceptions to be noted later .. 
'al · prov~ · the legislation follows the pattern of spec1 un 
0 
: 
ment district legislation for general county, city an · 
uild'ng 01 town purposes such as paving of streets, b 1 
ik com·' sidewalks curb and gutter, sewers and the 1 e. . 
' · JatiOn 
pare the State Statute with the general legis 
9 
authorizing improvement districts in counties (Chapter 
7 of Title 17, U. C. A. 1953) and cities and towns (Chap-
ter 16 of Title 10, U.C.A. 1953). But an important de-
viation is made in that the actual work to be done 
within the district is done solely by the public utilit-
ies involved rather than through competitiv.e bids let 
by the municipality and supervised by public officials. 
(Compare the State Statute, §54-8-25 and the Ordinance, 
39-7-Z7 with ~ 17-7-16 through 17-7-20, relating to coun-
ties, and ~10-16-8 and §10-16-9 relating to cities and 
towns.) Furthermore, ownership of the facilities thus 
constructed is specifically made the property of the 
public utility corporations and not the property of 
the property owners or even of the municipality 
which has created the district, levied the tax and is-
sued the bonds (State Statute, §54-8-25; Ordinance, ~39-
7-27). Furthermore, the costs of the work to be in-
cluded in the cost and feasibility report and on which 
the assessments are based must be in such an amount 
that the utility corporations involved are guaranteed 
a recovery out of the assessment monies of the cost 
to utility corporation (less depreciation) for the over-
head facilities which are being removed plus the cost 
of the removal itself, any additional cost of construc-
ting the underground facilities over the investment in 
the removed facilities and the cost of obtaining new 
easements if deemed necessary (State Statute ~54-8-24; 
'.:>rdinance §39-7-26). In addition, the public utility 
corporation is authorized to impose an additional 
cost on the property owner for providing underground 
service from its normal easement across the land in-
10 I 
volved to other parts of the property and this be. 1
1 
comes a part of the assessment and constitutes a 
grant of easement to the utility corporation (for I 
which the property owner receives no compensation) 
unless the property owner has made written objec. 
tion to the imposition of such costs at the time of 
the initial hearing on the district (See State Statute 
§54-8-26; Ordinance ~39-7-28). When the work is done, 
the public utility corporation presents its bill which 
the municipality is commanded to pay "within thirty 
days" (State Statute §54-8-27; Ordinance ~39-7-29). 
A. The State Statute and Ordinance Author-
ize Public Action and Taxation for a Private 
Purpose. 
It is a fundamental principle of our law that public 
I 
action cannot be taken and taxes imposed for private ~ 
I 
purposes. 
For a statute or tax to be lawful, it must be enact· 
ed for a valid public purpose. See 51 Am. JW"., Taxi!: 
tion, § 321, p. 372; 16 Mc Quillan, Municipal Corpora· 
tions, 3rd Ed. Rev., ~44.35, p. 116. The basis for this 
rule was perhaps most eloquently stated by Mr. Jus· 1 
tice Miller in Citizens Savings & Loan Assoc. v. City 
1 
of Topeka, 21 Wall. 655, 22 L. Ed. 455 (1874) where i 
he discussed the constitutionality of a state statute 1 
authorizing a direct grant of public funds and the is· : 
suance of government bonds to provide funds to ! 
donate to a private corporation. After stating the 
· ose ' 
rule that a tax which does not have a publlc pW'P 
"was beyond the legislative power, and was an un-
11 
authorized invasion of private right", he goes on to 
state: 
"It must be conceded that there are such 
rights in every free government beyond the 
control of the State. A government which 
recognized no such rights, which held the 
lives, the liberty, and the property of its 
citizens subject at all times to the absolute 
disposition and unlimited control of even the 
most democratic depository of power, is after 
all but a despotism. It is true it is a despot-
ism of the many, of the majority, if you 
chose to ca 11 it so, but it is none the less a 
despotism. It may well be doubted if a man 
is to hold all that he is accustomed to call 
his own, all in which he has placed his hap-
piness, and the security of which is essential 
to that happiness, under the unlimited dom-
inion of others, whether it is not wiser that 
this power should be exercised by one man 
than by many. 
"The theory of our governments, State and 
National, is opposed to the deposit of unlimit-
ed power anywhere. The executive, the legis-
lative, and the judicial branches of these 
governments are all of limited and defined 
powers. 
"There are limitations on such power which 
grow out of the essential nature of all free 
governments. Implied reservations of indivi-
dual rights, without which the social compact 
could not exist, and which are respected by 
all governments entitled to the name. 
" ... To lay with one hand the power of the 
government on the property of the citizen, 
12 
~nd. ~ith the o~her .to bestow it upon favored 
individuals to aid pnvate enterprises and build 
up private fortunes is none the less a robber• 
?ecause it is ct.one und~r !he forms of law an~ 
is called taxat10n. This is not legislation. It 
is a decree under legislative forms." 
See also Utah Constitution, Article VI, Section 26. 
I These principles have been recognized by this Court 
1
1 
See for example, Denver & Rio Grande Rwy. Co. v. 
Grand County, 51 Utah 294, 170 P. 74, 3 A.L.R. 1224; I' 
Wicks vs. Salt Lake City, 60 Utah 265, 208 P. 538; , 
Pearson v. Salt Lake County, 9 U.2d 388, 346 P.2d 155. f 
Applying this principle, it has been held that a city 
cannot levy taxes and issue bonds for the construc-
tion and operation of ~ hotel (Nash v. Town of Tar-
boro, 2'Z7 N. Car. 283, 42 S. E. 2d. 209); a public park-
ing garage could not be erected from tax money 
(Cleveland v. Rutle, 130 Ohio St. 465, 200 N.E. 507, 
103 A.L.R. 853) and land could not be condemned for 
parking lots (Barker v. Kansas City, 146 Kan. 347, 
70 P. 2d. 5). 
We have found no cases precisely involving conver-
sion of overhead utility lines to underground lines to 
the direct benefit of private utility corporations, 
Perhaps the closest case is Fish er v. Astoria, 126 
Ore. 268, 269 Pac. 857, 60 A.L.R. 260, where the Ore- I 
gon Supreme Court held it was a proper public pur-
1 
pose to levy assessments for ornamental lighting~ostl I 
and underground wires to light streets in a business . 
section of the city of Astoria. The case is distin- : 
guishable because it was involved with a lighting ; 
13 
system for streets enjoyed by the public and fur-
theimore streets in a business area of the city. There 
was no provision mentioned thatthe underground faci-
lities or the ornamental lighting poles would become 
the property of the private utility involved. The case 
seems to assume this would be public property be-
cause the opinion points out that the improvement 
did not become private in nature where only the elec-
tricity distributed was privately manufactured. The 
case of Irish v. Hahn, 208 Cal. 339, 281 Pac. 385, 66 
A.L.R. 1382, involved a street lighting district in 
downtown Pasadena and is likewise distinguishable 
because only lighting of public streets was involved 
and that by a publicly owned electric distribution 
system. 
In this case the State Statute can be used, and 
most commonly would be used, not for converting 
overhead street lighting to street lighting provided 
through underground wires and facilities, but primarily 
for electrical and telephone service of all types to 
residences and business establishments. This is the 
concern of the public. While the municiaplity may be 
and the utility co.rporations and is not the proper 
concern of th~a~~~iii~ii~~~ ved 
interested in aesthetics and perhaps might encourage 
public utilities and property owners to install under-
ground facilities rather than have overhead wires, this 
is not such an interest that should permit the use of 
the taxing power and the public credit for these pur-
poses at least in the absence of consent by the own-
ers involved. 
14 
The vice of the State Statute and Ordinance is its 
mandatory requirement that owners can be included 
in the district without their consent. The munici-
pality can create an improvement district even if up 
to one-third of the property owners fail to sign the 
petition Indeed, if we are correct that 54-8-4 author-
izes the governing body to act on its own initiative 
without petition from the property owners, the district 
could be created and the tax imposed notwithstanding 
the number or kind of objections. At least it is 
apparent that the governing body can, after a peti-
tion from property owners, create the district and 
impose the tax notwithstanding the number of objec-
tions. Note that the signing of the petition does not 
foreclose the property owner from thereafterobjecting : 
nor should it because the initial petition precedes the 
cost and feasibility report and the public hearing 
where information is available on which the property 
owner can make an intelligent decision. 
Contrast this result with the Municipal Improve-
ment District Act where assessment districts for im· 
provements to be publicly owned and to be installed 
under the supervision and control of public officers 
can be prevented if two-thirds of the property owners 
• I 
file objections. 10-16-7 (3) U.C.A. 1953. Under tlns 
statute, the municipality has no jurisdiction to proceed 
with the district if the necessary protests are filed. 
Armstrong v. Ogden City, 12 Utah 476, 43 Pac. 119; 
affd 168 U.S. 224, 18 S. Ct. 98, 42 L. Ed. 444. 
But both the State Statute and the 8rdinance per· 
mit a district to be created and a tax imposed not· 1 
~ 
I 
--
15 
withstanding objections by a large number of the pro-
perty owners affected - even though they do not 
agree that their property would be beautified or en-
hanced by the removal of the wires - even though 
they feel the cost is too high or that a tax lien on 
their property is an unwise encumbrance. See Pear-
son v. Salt Lake County, supra (concurring opinion). 
If the principal basis for justifying public action 
of this type is beautification of the envirorunent, 
the property owners who may have a different 
aesthetic sensibility or who may wish to preserve 
their pocketbooks or property rights can find their 
wishes overridden by the governing body at the in-
stance of the despotic majority of which Mr. Justic 
Miller speaks. 
But the State Statute goes further and authorizes 
these severe results for the benefit of the public 
utility corporations involved. The Power Company and 
the Telephone Company in this case and similar uti-
lity corporations in other districts are guaranteed 
that they will not lose anything but indeed are guar-
anteed that they will gain full reimbursement for the 
corporations' investment in the overhead facilities, all 
costs of removal thereof, all costs of constructing 
underground facilities in excess of their original cost 
of the overhead facilities, costs of obtaining new ease-
ments and finally, title to all of the new facilities 
including a new easement for service lines extending 
from the underground distribution lines to the build-
ing or facility to be served with the electric or tele-
phone service. Furthermore, the work is done en-
16 
tirely as the utility corporations determine using their 
own contractor. The normal protection which the 
public expects of contracts let on competitive bids 
is not provided for and apparently there is no authori-
zation and certainly no requirement that public officers 
(such as the City Engineer) supervise and approve 
the work that is done. The work when done becomes I 
the property of the utilities and any title in the 
1
, 
municipality is expressly denied. From the point of 
view of the citizens of the city within and without I 
the district and particularly those owners who did not r 
consent to the formation of the district, the public 
power of taxation is being used for the private bene- I 
fit of the utility corporations involved and those 
owners within the district who have consented to 
the tax or to the formation of the district. 
B. The State Statute and Ordinance Authorizes 
a Lending of Public Credit for.Private Purposes 
Contrary to the Utah Consitution. 
Article VI, § 31 of the Utah Constitution prohibits 
the legislature from authorizing either the state or any 
of its political subdivisions including counties, cities 
and towns from lending its credit "in aid of any rail· 
road, telegraph or other private individual or corpor· 
ate enterprise or undertaking." Because the state sta-
tute and ordinance authorize the issuance of bonds to 
pay the utility corporations the costs guaranteed to 
them and described above, we contend that this sec· 
tion of the Constitution is violated. 
This Court has construed this Constitutional pro-
vision in several cases. In Lehi City v. Meiling. 
~ 
17 
87 Utah 237, 48 P. 2d 530, the section was held not 
violated by the Metropolitan Water District Act au-
thorization to such districts to join with other corp-
orations to ca1Ty out its functions. There was no 
lending of credit so long as the district limited its 
cooperation with other corporations to securing water 
for public purposes. Similarly, in Barlow v. Clear-
field City Corp., 1 Utah 2d. 419, 268 P. 2d. 682, and 
Bair v. Layton City Corp., 6 Utah 2d. 138, 307 P. 
2d. 895, municipal contracts for obtaining water and 
sewer services were upheld because of the public 
importance and public use of the water and sewer 
facilities thus obtained. 
Somewhat closer to the present situation is State 
Road Commission vs. Utah Power & Light Co., 10 
Utah 2d 333, 353 P. 2d. 171. There reimbursement 
to utility corporations for the removal of utility faci-
litites necessitated by highway construction was up-
held. There, however, utilities we!"e only being 
reimbursed for costs incurred as a result of needed 
public highways. Here the costs involved are to be 
reimbursed for a private benefit, that of the property 
owners and utilities involved. The public as such will 
not benefit from the underground facilities for they 
cannot be used as a highway is used. Only the pro-
perty owner and the utility corporation will use the 
facilities once they are relocated underground. 
In Allen v. Tooele County, 21 U. 2d. 383, 445 P. 
2d. 994, this Court upheld the validity of bonds issued 
under the Utah Industrial Facilities Development Acl 
There as here, the proceeds of the bonds end up dir-
18 
ectly or indirectly in the hands of private parties. , 
But this Court held that the constitutional provision 
is not violated because the obligation to pay the 
bonds was only out of the rentals paid by the private 
company for the use of the facilities constructed. 
It was a limited obligation of the public agency issu-
ing the bonds and did not involve its "credit" in the 
constitutional sense. Here, however, bonds are is-
suable by the city, county or town involved which 
are apparently not limited solely to payment from a 
special fund as was the situation in the Allen case. 
Section 54-8-22 of the State Statute and the corre-
sponding provision of the Ordinance, Section 39-7-24, 
simply authorizes bonds to be issued to the extent 
of the unpaid balance of the assessments for the per- ' 
iod of time over which the assessments are payable 
and secured by and payable from a pledge of the ass-
essment money. The customary prohibitions on the 
collection of bonds issued from funds other than as-
sessments is missing from the State Statute· and Or-
dinance. See Point II of this brief for a more extend-
ed discussion of this omission. 
A further distinction from the Tooele Countycase 
is the important fact that while the bonds remained 
outstanding title to the property involved remained 
in the public agency issuing the bonds, subject to the 
lease to the private corporation. The private corpora-
tion was required to pay rental for the use of the 
facilities developed with proceeds of the bonds. Here, 
the title to the facilities is expressly denied to the 
1 
public agency involved. At no time does the county, 
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city or town own or have the right to own either the 
overhead facilities which are removed or the under-
gound facilities which are constructed. See State 
Statute, ~54-8-25; Ordinance, ~39-7-27. 
Finally, the effect of the statutory scheme is to 
lend public credit to the private utility. But, for the 
State Statute, a property owner desiring underground 
facilities across his property would contract with the 
utility for such service. While a public utility corpor-
ation must provide service to those who request it, 
we know of no provision which requires the utility 
to serve by underground facilities. Accordingly, the 
property owner would have to bargain with the uti-
lity for this type of special service. Unless the pro-
perty owner paid cash to cover the cost of the under-
ground facility, the utility corporation would 
use money obtained from issuance of securities, 
debt obligations or from rate revenues relying on 
the property owner to reimburse it for its costs over 
a period of time. The State Statute and Ordinance 
arrive at the same result: The property owner pays 
the assessments over a period of time, but the utility 
company, instead of using its own funds or funds ob-
tained from issuance of securities or debt obligations, 
uses funds obtained from the issuance of debt obliga-
tions of the municipality. The proceeds of the bonds 
Will be used by the city to pay the bills submitted 
by the utility companies. It is a plan to use public 
credit supported by public taxes for the purpose of 
financing conversion of privately owned overhead 
lines to privately owned underground facilities for 
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the benefit of the pn· at t·1·t· v e u i I ies and private pr 
perty owners. This is clearly a use of the ubt 
ed . f · p IC er it or private purposes. 
C. :11e State Statute. and Ordinance Constitute , 
an U~awful Delegat10nofl\lunicipa!Functions 1 
to Private Corporations. 
Article YI. ~· 29 of the Utah Constitution provides 
as follows: 
The legislature shall not delegate to any special 
commission, private corporation or association. 
any power to make, supervise or interfere 
with any municipal improvement, money. 
property or effects, whether held in trust or , 
otherwise, to levy taxes, to select a capitol 
site, or to perform any municipal functions. 
This section has been construed in numerous cases 
by this Court, but always in cases involving "special 
commissions" which have been claimed to interlere 
with powers of local government granted to cities, 
towns and counties. In Tygesen v. Magna Water Co" 
119 Utah 274, 226 P. 2d 127; Lehi City v. Mei/ing, 
supra; Backman v. Salt Lake County, 13 U. 2d 412, 37v 
P. 2d 756; Carter v. Beaver County, 16 U. 2d 280, 399 
P. 2d 440 and County Water System v. Salt Lake City, 
3 U. 2d 46, 278 P. 2d 285, the Court was concerned 
with state statutes authorizing the creation of various 
types of special public agencies or political subdivisions. 
There are no Utah cases involving the delegationto I 
a strictly private corporation such as is here involve~, 
perhaps because it is so obviously contrary to tlns 
provision of the Constitution. 
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The c:ases, however, do indicate clearly that the 
purpose of the Constitutional provision is to preserve 
local self-government to cities, towns and counties 
with respect to its proper municipal functions. See 
Logan City v. Public Utilities Commission, 72 Utah 
536, 271 Pac. 961 at 972. In Backman v. Salt Lake 
County, supra., this court stated as follows: 
"Three conditions are necessary to violate this 
provision: (1) delegation to a private com-
mission of power to (2) interfere with municipal 
property or (3) to perform a municipal func-
tion." 
That there is a delegation involved in the State Sta-
tute and Ordinance seems plain for the utility corpor-
ations are involved from the beginning with their cost 
and feasibility report. If the project is continued be-
yond that stage, the utility corporations take over 
the construction of the new improvements and the 
removal of the old overhead wire. The public agency 
is not involved even in a supervisory capacity as 
pointed out above. The public agency whose duty 
it is to protect the citizens of the city, including the 
property owners within the district, from the abuse 
of public credit and improper expenditure of tax funds 
must stand aside while the utility corporation hires 
its own contractor at such cost as the utility corpora-
tion thinks is proper and then passes this cost on to 
the property owners. 
There is no "municipal property" involved which 
is interfered with in violation of this section because 
as we have pointed out above, title to all of the 
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have an unusual omission. The bonds may b · . e 1ssuea 
for the unpaid balance of the assessments levied ana 
1
. 
for the period of time over which the assessments are 
payable. Otherwise, they are in such form as the is. 
suer determines. While it is true that the State Sta. I 
tute in ~ 54-8-22 and Jrdinance in ~ 39-7-24 provides , 
that the bonds "shall be secured by and payable from 
the irrevocable pledge and dedication of the fund~ 
derived from the levy and collection of the special 
assessments in anticipation of the collection of which 
they are issued", there is nothing that limits the 
• I 
bondholder to the assessment morues as the sole : 
source of payment, nor is the issuer prohibited from 
obligating the full faith and credit of the municipality. 
Compare these provisions with the statute authorizing 
assessment bonds in cities and towns, ~10-16-:?7 and 
10-16-29, U.C. A. 1953. ~10-16-27 provides for the is· 
suance of "special improvement bonds to pay the 
costs of the improvements in the district against the · 
f uruis created by the assessment." The latter section 
specifically states that such bonds "are not a gen-
eral obligation of the municipality" and then goes : 
on to make this fact certain by stating "no munici· i 
pality shall be held liable for the payment of any I 
special improvement bond except to the exten~ of 
the funds created and received by assessments agamst 1 
which the bonds are issued and to the extent of i~ \ 
" Under special improvement guaranty fund ... · 
such provisions it is plain that any bond issued 
must be limited in payment to the special fund crea~ 
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ed by the assessment and accordingly no "debt" in 
the constitutional sense is involved. Here, however, 
the State Statute does not provide that assurance 
and thus debts will or may be created with no elec-
tion having been held and without regard to the 
constitutional debt limits. The taxpayers through-
out the city could conceivably be taxed to pay a 
defaulted bond. The risk of this should not be toler-
ated and the State Statute and Ordinance should be 
declared unconstitutional. 
POINT III 
THE STATE STATUTE AND ORDINANCE 
UNCONSTITUTIJNALLY DENY DUE PRO-
CESS JF LAW 
The State Statute and Ordinance have the appear-
ance of affording ample due process in the procedural 
sense by the series of notices and hearings required. 
However, hearings which are merely an empty for-
mality and where no real determinations of the merit 
of objections are considered, does not constitute due 
process of law. 
The initial hearing is perhaps the most important 
because, at this time, a determination is made to 
create the district or to make changes in the original 
proposal with respect to the size of the district. Here 
the law is deficient in two respects. 
First, there is no provision setting forth the time 
prior to the hearing when the mailed, published and 
posted notices must be given. The State Statute in 
54-8-10 simply provides that the notice be published 
''one time" in a newspaper of general circulation in 
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the district or of general circulation in the count 
city or town in which the district is located. WhJ~ 
posting and mailing is also required, there is nc 
time specified prior to the hearing within which these 
actions must be completed. For all that appears 
from the statute, notice could be given the day of the 
hearing or what might be just as defective, several 
months prior to the hearing. Procedural due process 
seems to demand that notice be given a reasonable 
time prior to the hearing, but not an unreasonably 
long time prior to the hearing. Commonly, statutes 
of this type set forth these requirements. See for 
example, 10-16-6, U.C.A. 1953 where publication is 
required once during each week for four successive 
weeks with the last publication "to be at least five 
days and not more than twenty days prior to the 
time fixed in the notice as the last day for the filing 
of protests." See also, 11-14-3, U.C.A. 1953, relating , 
to notices of bond elections. Without standards as 
to time provided by the law, arbitrary action and pro-
ceeding without a notice that is in fact adequate, is 
permitted. That this is a vital requirement is 
emphasized by the provisions of the State Statute 
in ~ 54-8-12 and the corresponding provision of the 
Ordinance, ~39-7-13 that real property owners who 
fail to appear at the hearing and make object:on 
··shall be deemed to have waived every such obiec· 
tion." 
. held seems Jn the second place, the hearing once 
to be merely a perfunctory matter and too much de-
. f th public uti· 
pendent on the reports and actions o e 
lity corporations. ~54-8-11 of the State Statute (Ordin-
ance, 039-7-12) states that representatives of the utility 
corporations "shall be present at all such hearings." 
'.)newonders if the county or city commission or town 
board has the right or jurisdiction to proceed if the 
power company and telephone company representa-
tive fails to appear. Even if the governing body de-
cides to make a change in the proposed improvements 
or the proposed district which "appear" to affect the 
feasibility or cos tof the improvements proposed (which 
determination can be made only after consultation 
with the utilities), then the same sections, in manda-
tory language, require that the hearing be adjourned 
until a new cost and feasibility report can be pre-
pared by the utilities. 
The fundamental problem, however, is the cost and 
feasibility report itself. As previously noted, the cost 
formula of ~ 54-8-24 is a rigid one designed to guaran-
tee to the utility full reimbursement of its investment 
plus costs of the changed facilities. It is not desiE;n-
ed to minimize costs to the property owner. Indeed, 
since there is no assurance of the lowest cost by com-
petitive bids and because the utility is permitted to 
{klSs on to the property owners all costs, whatever 
they may be, there is really no incentive to the utility 
to minimize costs. There is no real opportunity for 
the property owners or for the governing body of the 
municipality involved to inquire into the basis of the 
costs. ln effect, the choice is accept the cost and fea-
sibility report of the utility or discontinue all work 
in the district. '111is is not really changed by the pro-
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visions of 54-8-11 permitting the governing body to 
make changes in the district or in the improvem1::nts 
because this must be followed by a new cost and fea. 
sibility report from the utility. That the utility cor-
poration will tend to be generous in its estimates of 
cost seems assured by the provisions of ~ 54-8-27 
(Ordinance, §39-7-29) which limits the utilityreim-
bursement for cost to not more than its original esti-
mate. 
All of these factors separately, and certainly taken 
together, constitute a denial of due process in fact 
even though appearances of fairness are maintained. 
POINT IV 
THE METIIOD OF ASSESSMENT CONSTI-
TUTES A DENIAL JF DUE PROCESS AND 
THE EQUAL PROTECT! JN OF THE LAWS 
The guiding principle and the theory justifying the 
imposition of special assessments is. benefit to the 
property owner from the improvements for which 
the assessment is made and a proper apportionment 
of that benefit among all property owners affected 
by the making of the improvement. A leading text 
writer has stated the rules as follows: 
"Assessments, as distinguished from other 
kinds of taxation, are those special and l?cal 
impositions upon the property in the im~ediate 
vicinity of municipal improvements, which are 
necessary to pay for the improvem~nts, and 
are made with reference to the special ben& 
fit which the property is supposed to .h~ve 
derived therefrom." ( McQuillen, Municipal 
Corporations, 3rd Edition Revised, Vol. 14, 
§38.01). 
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··special assessment or special taxation, there-
fore, is lawful and constitutional only when 
founded upon special benefits accrued from 
the improvement for which the tax or assess-
ment is laid. In other words, the test in all 
special taxation or assessment proceedings 
which is constantly invoked by the courts, is 
that the assessment should not exceed the 
special benefit to the property." (Op. cit., 
~38.02). 
"To be valid and constitutional the special 
assessment or tax must be fairly within the 
limits of the benefits conferred, and just 
and uniform throughout the assessment, the 
benefit or taxing district, or applicable alike 
to those compelled to pay who are similarly 
situated." (Op. cit.,§38.05). 
The leading case on the subject is Norwood v. Baker, 
172 U.S. 269, 19 S. Ct. 187, 43 L. Ed. 443. See also 
French v. Barber Asphal.t Paving Company, 181 U.S. 
324, 21 S. Ct. 625, 45 L. Ed. 879; Louisville and Nash-
ville Railway Company v. Barber Asphalt Paving 
Company, 197 U.S. 430, 25 S. Ct. 466, 49 L. Ed. 819. 
In Gast Realty Co. v. Schneider Granite Co., 240 
U.S. 55, 36 S. Ct. 254, 60 L. Ed. 523, the United States 
Supreme Court stated, ". . .if the law is of such a 
character that there is no reasonable presumption 
that substantial justice generally will be done, but 
the probability is that the parties will be taxed dis-
proportionately to each other and to the benefit con-
ferred, the law cannot stand .... " 
The State Statute recognizes, as it must, the princi-
ple of benefit as being the basis for the assessments 
to be levied in the improvement district created under 
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the act. (See State Statute, ~ 54-8-5, 54_8_15, 54_8_rn 
54-8-17). However, the State Statute is deficient i~ 
two respects and fails to comply with the co t' . ns l!u. 
t10nal principles applicable to such taxation. 
First, the basis for the assessment is the square 
footage of the lots within the district. § 54-8-5 pro-
vides in part, "Each lot and parcel of the land shall I 
be separately assessed for the cost and expenses 
1 
thereof in proportion to the number of square feel i 
of such lands and lots abutting, adjoining, conti- / 
guous and adjacent thereto or included in the im-
provement district, and in proportion to the benefits 
derived to such property by said improvements.'' 
Other methods of determining benefits and apportion- r 
ing costs are not authorized. Apportionment, accord- ' 
ing to frontage or the length of the distribution lines . 
within the particular property or according to assessed 
I 
valuation of the property or according to the service , 
supplied through the facilities, is not authorized. i 
Square footage is the sole method permitted and this ! 
can lead to inequitable results. The owner of 
a smaller lot than his neighbors, although receiving 
exactly the same electric and telephone service, would 
be assessed a smaller amount. A property owner 
who uses large amounts of electric or telephone ser· 
vice would pay the same as his neighbor whose needs 1 
are smaller simply because the size of their lots are 
1 
the same or similar. The method of assessment I 
thus becomes arbitrary by its very mechanical~~ 
. "t bly apportion plication. It cannot be said to eqm a ' 
· gnitiono! benefits. In contrast, and no doubt m reco 
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the many problems involved in apportioning special 
assessments fairly, the Municipal Improvement Dis-
trict Act authorizes assessments according to frontage, 
according to area, according to assessed valuation or 
by any combination of such methods. See 10-16-16 
U.C.A. 1953. Note also, that the requirement that 
assessments must be equal and uniform according 
to the benefits received as stated in §10-16-16 is miss-
ing from the State Statute and Ordinance in question 
here. 
A second problem with the State Statute and )r-
dinance is the failure to recognize the benefit to the 
public utility corporations involved by either appor-
tioning a part of the cost to the utility corporations 
or permitting assessments on them. The statutory 
scheme is designed to guarantee return to the utili-
ties of all of their costs and it is only the property 
owners within the district that are assessed. It is 
obvious that underground facilities do benefit the 
utilities. Falling wires due to wind, ice, falling trees 
and the like are avoided. Transformers are placed on 
or below the ground and danger of lightning damage 
to such equipment is lessened. Maintenance is made 
easier and very likely less expensive because it can 
be conducted from ground level. Expensive equip-
ment to elevate men and facilities on poles and wires 
is no longer needed. Injury to personnel from falls 
is minimized. Weathering of wires and other equip-
ment is virtually eliminated. Undoubtedly, there 
are other utility company benefits from underground 
facilities. However, the State Statute and Ordinance 
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recognize none of these benefits and apportio 
th t ·1 · · n to e u 1 1hes none of the costs of the impro 
. . . vemen~ 
m recogmt1on of these benefits. Instead ·t · 
, 1 1s as. 1 
sumed that all benefits are received by the property 
owners within the district. 
By failing to apportion assessments fairly and uni. t 
formly and by failing to take into account the bene-
fits to all persons ··affected or benefited" by the 
improvements, the State Statute and Drdinance are /1 
contrary to principles of due process and unifonn 
operation of the laws and deny to property owners i 
within the district the equal protection of the laws. ! 
Utah Constitution, Article I, Sections 2, 7 and 24; /1 
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV. 
POINTV 
THE STATE STATUTE AND ORDINANCE 
PERMIT THE TAKING OFPROPERTYWITH-
OUT JUST COMPENSATION. 
I 
Fundamental to our society is the principle that I 
property of citizens cannot be taken for use by others 
without just compensation. Utah Constitution, Article 
I, Section 22. Portions of the State Statute and Jr· 
dinance permit and even require that property be 
taken without any provision being made for compen- , 
sation to the property owners for the taking. 
1 
Consider first the fact that the utility easement I 
. . . f I and over· which was origmally estabhshed or po es 
. n under-' head wires and lines is converted mto a · 
Ev if the UJJ-ground easement over such property. en rt 
derground facilities traverse the same area of prope 1 
I 
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as the overhead wires formerly occupied or are con-
tained within the vertical limit.s of the utility ease-
ment commonly established at the time subdivisions 
are created or when the first utility service is sup-
plied, there is still such a substantial change result-
ing from the conversion to underground that in ef-
fect, a new easement is created. What was formerly 
wires strung across a backyard under which trees and 
flowers could be planted, fences placed, sprinkling sys-
tems installed, out buildings erected and other improve-
ments made, now becomes a dedication to the use 
by the utilities of a portion of the ground itself. 
Surely it was not within the contemplation of the 
property owner who may have granted an original 
easement for overhead lines that a subsequent con-
version to underground would permit the tearing up 
of a fence, the destruction of trees and shrubs, the 
interference with his gardening activities and the like. 
It is apparent that this drastic a change constitutes 
a new and different property interest. 
No provision is made for compensation to the pro-
perty owner except "when technical considerations 
make it reasonably necessary to utilize easements for 
the underground facilities different from those used 
for aboveground facilities, or where the pre-existing 
easements are insufficient for the underground facili-
ties," (State Statute, §54-8-24; ::lrdinance, §39-7-26). 
Even if it is necessary to obtain such a "new" ease-
ment, its cost becomes one of the costs of making 
the improvement for which the utility company is 
reimbursed. This is a reverse twist on normal prin-
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ciples of eminent domain because these same ( costs 
are apportioned back to the property owner from f 
whom the easement is obtained. Not only does he I 
lose a portion of his property, but in effect he must 
pay himself for this loss. r 
The second failure of the State Stature and Ordin-
ance in this regard involves the easement for the 
service lines from the residence or building on the 
property to the underground lines serving the neigh-
borhood. Here the State Statute and Ordinance go 
one step further because the easement for such ser-
vice lines is obtained not only without compensation, 
but also without any written grant or authorization 
from the property owner. See ~ 54-8-26 of the State 
Statute and ~ 39-7-28 of the Ordinance. There it is 
provided that the simple failure by the property own-
er to file "written objection" is considered as the 
owner's consent and grant of easement to the utility. 
This same failure to act is also treated as authority 
to the utility to trespass on the property owner's 
land. (It should be noted also that notice to the pro-
perty owner of his right to make such an objection 
is not required to be stated in the notice of in-
tention for the creation of the district). Even if the 
objection is filed, its only effect appears to beto 
1 
avoid inclusion of the costs in the special assessment 
The costs must still be paid because the State Statute 
provides that the owner becomes responsible fordoing 
the work himself and "shall be billed" by the utili~y 
for whatever work the utility company does on his ' 
h Conclusion property. There appears to be no ot er 
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but that the substance and effect of these provisions 
is to permit the utility companies to take private pro-
perty without payment of just compensation therefor. 
CONCLUSION 
The State Statute and Ordinance should be held 
unconstitutional for the reasons noted. These laws 
are too heavily laced with private interest to with-
stand judicial scrutiny. While permitting private pro-
perty owners and utility companiestofinanceimprove-
ments to their property, the slight public benefit 
does not justify public action for this purpose nor 
the use of mandatory powers to force improvements 
on unwilling property owners. This also adversely 
affects taxpayers throughout the city, town or county. 
If the public credit and the tax power can be used 
for the benefit of a few, it is that much less avail-
able for the benefit of the public at large. ·when one 
also considers that the utility companies largely de-
termine the manner in which these powers are used, 
the constitutional infirmities of the law become ap-
parent. 
For the reasons stated in this brief, the decision 
below should be reversed, with instructions to enter 
judgment declaring the State Statute and Jrdinance 
unconstitutional and for an injunction against the 
taking of further proceedings in the improvement dis-
trict involved in this case. 
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